Mumbai Police not prepared to tackle commando-like attack

The Ram Pradhan Committee formed by the state government post 26/11 has raised doubts over the leadership of the police force on that night. The committee also stated that they found instances where the police department failed to handle the intelligence inputs sighting terror threats and maintaining high degree of efficiency to deal with terror attacks like 26/11.

The 90-odd pages report, which touched upon various roles played by senior police officers and police departments found that the Maharahstra police had not experienced a direct commando attack like 2001 Parliament attack or 2002 Akshardham temple attack.

Except the 1993 serial bomb blasts, wherein arms, ammunitions and explosives had come through the sea route, all other terrorist attacks in the city were carried out by using Improvised Explosive Devices (IED).

The Committee appreciated the role played by DCP Zone 1 Vishwas Nangre Patil and DCP (Special Branch u20132) Rajvardhan who tried to ferret out the terrorists from within Hotel Taj. They also appreciated the act of Additional Commissioner of Police (South Region) Sadanand Date, who faced the terrorists at Cama hospital and was seriously injured.

The Committee also appreciated the citizens of Mumbai who reported a sack full of RDX left behind by the terrorists at several sites including the CST railway station toilet.

The Committee findings are sub-divided into areas:

INTELLIGENCE:

Inquiry: There were several intelligence reports beginning 7th August 2006 indicating that LeT was making preparations to infiltrate Fidayeen (Commando terrorists) into India by sea route. Six alerts were on the possibility of sea borne attack while 11 were on the possibility of multiple and simultaneous attacks and three were on the possibility of commandos attack. However there was no specific intelligence that sea borne terrorists would attack either Taj or Oberoi. Some Intelligence alerts, however, pointed a possibility of these two luxury hotels as well as CST likely to being targets of some terrorist violence. There was no intelligence on Cama Hospital and Nariman House being targets of attack.

Committee's Observation: Tragically, the Taj and the Oberoi managements did not implement certain important security advice given by DCP Zone-1 because of their own policy perspective as hospitality industry. The Committee has noted that no request was received from Taj or other hotels to augment police security for them in view of such alert. Also The Committee found that presently all intelligence alerts are mechanically forwarded to operational units either by DGP's Office (sometimes with a demi-official letter) or ATS, or by Home department.u00a0 The Committee found total confusion in the processing of intelligence alerts at the level of State Government.

ACTION TO HANDLE THE ATTACKS

Inquiry: The sudden and enormity of task facing the Mumbai Police is evident from the sequence of events. First call regarding Leopold came to the Control Room (C/R) at 2148 hours about foreigners being injured. At 2150 hours Tourist Mobile was shot at and at 2154 hours details of Taj firing emerged. At 2156 hours Oberoi shooting report came in and at 2159 hours CST firing was reported. Then came the report of a taxi being blown up at Wadi Bunder at 2156 hours and at 2253 hours report regarding another taxi exploding at Vile Parle.
These simultaneous incidents sparked off panic all over the city leading to the Control Room (C/R) receiving as many as 1365 calls between 2100 and 0200hours among which 267 were terrorism related calls. (4.5 calls per minute). Rumours came in that 60 terrorists had entered the city. C/R was flooded by panicky calls from the out-numbered police units facing actions at different spots. Overload of wireless (O/T) communication system made the officers and the Control Room utilize personal cellular mobiles/ alternate channels for communication with each other. Although the Committee studied in all 2312 entries in the C/R logs, to that extent they were incomplete and we had to depend on oral and some written reports to reconstruct the course of action by police, especially action by C/R to manage the activity at several scenes of action. However it is apparent that simultaneous attacks and calls from field units for more manpower did result in deployment of striking reserves in a haphazard and helter-skelter manner.

Committee's Observation:u00a0 It appears to the Committee that in general the Mumbai Police initially responded to multi-targeted attacks efficiently, but in a manner that they usually respond to a law and order situation. Initial response from the police stations, striking mobiles and senior officers was quite prompt as evident from the C/R logs. But they were handicapped since by the time the police had reached the spot the terrorists (except in CST) had already positioned themselves on higher levels at vantage locations after the initial killings from where they could fire upon and lob grenades at the approaching police parties. On the other hand the policemen were in the usual law & order uniform mostly equipped to perform normal policing duties. It was commendable that some policemen had rushed with only lathis (cane/ bamboo sticks) to face the terrorists.

MEANS TO FACE TERRORIST ATTACKS
The Committee has carefully looked into adequacy or otherwise of specialized force available to Mumbai Police and also how it was used. A brief description of that is given in following paragraphs.

QUICK RESPONSE TEAM
Inquiry: The Committee was briefed that QUICK RESPONSE TEAMS (QRT) was trained by State Reserve Police Force (SRPF) in commando course in Pune for 1u00bd months and three months by NSG at Manesar. However, no actual simulated training in facing terrorist attacks and hostage rescue was given at Manesar. Since September 27, 2007 no firing practice was done due to shortage of practice ammunition. The 'battle dress' worn by them consists of bulletproof jackets, which protect vital organs from rifle rounds and also from grenades splinters. This is not total protection from grenade blast.
According to the Committee, QRT without on-the-spot leadership cannot be an effective instrument. Present ATS chief (Addl.DGP, Railways) who took charge on Shri Karkare's death told the Committee that he had individually questioned QRT men on what went wrong. They told him that there was none to lead them in Taj and also in Oberoi where they had gone up to 9th floor.

Committee's Observation: The Committee feels that a small force of commandos should be available to be deployed at very short notice with the Commissioner of Police, Mumbai, by equipping and retraining the existing QRT with the best protective gear to withstand and counter 26/11 type of attacks, including grenade attacks. Later in the report the Committee has suggested how to transform QRT into a more effective and efficient force at the disposal of the Commissioner of Police.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Inquiry: The Committee examined the Standard Operating Practice (SOP) in case of bomb blast/terrorist strike sent to us by CP. It lays down that the Jt CP (L&O) will head the Crisis Management Command and be in charge of all control rooms. Jt CP (Crime) would work in close association with Jt CP (ATS).
Committee's observation: These instructions were not followed on 26/11/2008. The CP decided instead to direct Jt CP (Crime) to be in-charge of the C/R when as correctly described in the SOP, Jt CP (L&O), being in-charge of all police stations in Mumbai was better suited to decide on marshalling of forces at various sites. The Committee is of the view that on occasion of a crisis, such as the Mumbai faced that the CP should have been in the Command Centre in the Control Room which might have helped in better utilization of forces and prevented duplication of efforts by different police units.
Nevertheless, the Committee has noted with appreciation the role played by Shri Rakesh Maria, Jt CP (Crime) in the C/R in handling a very serious crisis situation extending over three days. The Committee is also appreciative of the dedicated work performed by Control Room staff including officers, Wireless operators and men in maintaining records.

However, the Committee is constrained to observe that as a rule, carefully prepared SOPs that draw upon experience and lessons from past, should not be overlooked in crisis management. If each top officer, such as the CP or the DGP treats SOPs in cavalier manner, why have the SOPs at all?

COASTAL SECURITY
Committee's Observation: The Committee has noted that despite receiving as many as six alerts between August 2006 and April 2008 about the likelihood of sea route by terrorists, no significant steps had been taken by the State administration / Government to beef up coastal security by having regular interaction with the Coast Guards although the Government of India had notified on 22 Sep 2003 the Coast Guards as the Lead Intelligence Agency (LIA) for coastal/sea borders.
Inquiry: It was well known that the patch-work joint patrolling started from 1993 had not worked. Nothing other than convening meetings seems to have been achieved as evident from the information given by the DGP Maharashtra. The difficulties of coastal patrolling requires serious attention as Maharashtra has a coastline of over 720 kms and Mumbai is an island surrounded by sea and densely forested mangrove creeks.
Committee's Observation: The Committee finds that arrangements for monitoring security along the coast continues to face several impediments despite some recent decisions at higher levels of the Government of India and the Maharashtra authorities.

ANTI-TERRORISM SQUAD
Inquiry: The Committee has noted that the structure of ATS and its operations are presently in a somewhat confusing state because of duality of command. ATS was originally created for the whole of Maharashtra State in July 2004, but as a part of the Mumbai City Police with a strength of one IGP, two DIGs (Additional Commissioners of Police), two SPs, eight inspectors, 8 APIs and some clerical staff, because Mumbai city was facing terrorist attacks from 1993 onwards.
In the same GR it was stated that one DIG will look after the work in Mumbai city while the other will be for the rest of Maharashtra. Although it was stated that ATS would be finally under the control of the DGP (Maharashtra) it was laid down that the IGP will report to the DGP through the CP, Mumbai. The work of ATS outside Mumbai will be supervised by Commissioner (SID). It was further stated that DGP will exercise supervision over ATS through the CP, Mumbai and Commissioner (SID). Finally it was stated that DGP will take into account Commissioner's (SID) views while assessing the work of IGP (ATS). Thus the Commissioner (SID) was given by the Government a definite role to supervise ATS.
However who at a higher level supervises the 'outside Mumbai wing' in the DGP'su00a0 HQ was amended byu00a0 an executive order passed by a former DGP, to put this squad under the Additional DG (L&O), Maharashtra State, in the DGP's HQ . This is yet another instance of individuals over riding the system. Government must insist that no official, however high should change decisions taken in larger interest, by the Government, to suit individual predilections or preferences.

Committee's Observation: ATS was not working smoothly. ATS's functioning must be handled in a manner that, what is available today to the Mumbai police is not weakened, if not destroyed. The Committee is of the view thatu00a0 foru00a0 'Outside Mumbai'u00a0u00a0 requirements, there is need to createu00a0 such teamsu00a0 and place them at the head quarters of the cities with Commissioners of Police. Their command and control set up can be formulated by the DGP. What is most important is to equip, train and keep them on toes all times to respond to emergencies and not treat as show piece units. More important, such specialized units should not be broken up and deployed at the whim of individual officers. That is an important lesson of 26/11.u00a0 The Committee recommends that Government should reiterate that normally all terrorist attack cases in Mumbai city as well as in rest of Maharashtra should be investigated by ATS alone unless otherwise decided by the Government..

FLYING SQUADS
Inquiry: The Committee was briefed that in the 1990s Special Motor Cycle borne commandos in 'buddy pairs' were raised and trained to deal with violent "under world" crimes and for immediate response to terrorist strikes within the city. Government, vide the GR dated 11/2/2000, had created 100 flying squads of two commandos each, for all the Commissionarates in the State of which Mumbai was allotted 46 flying squads, that is 92 policemen with 40 motor cycles. They were trained for three months in Karate, handling of wireless sets, rescue of captives, handling of weapons such as AK-47, SLR, Carbines, 9 mm pistols etc. The Committee was informed that presently 58 commandos are working under Assistant Commissioner of Police, Armed Police, Marol. While most are deployed at various sensitive places only 10 to 15 are available for any emergency duty. The Committee did not find that they had any role on 26/11.

HANDLING OF SECURITY INTELLIGENCE AT OPERATIONAL LEVELS

Inquiry: The Committee found that in the CP Mumbai's set up Security Intelligence, especially on terrorism in Mumbai City, is disseminated by several officials: ATS, Additional Commissioner (Special Branch) and Additional Commissioner (Protection). There must be coordination and cohesion in their working.

Committee's Observation: The Committee suggests that the CP should examine this.

OTHER MISCELLANEOUS RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee would recommendu00a0u00a0 to transform the present QRT into a well-equipped Commando Force at the disposal of Mumbai police, which should be in a position to move anywhere in the city with least possible delay.u00a0
The Committee was briefed aboutu00a0 a new commando force called 'FORCE-1u00a0 approved by the Government.u00a0 This will be under the DGP and located perhaps outside Mumbai. However, it is relevant to point out that all city police forces in the world have their own small commando forces to act as immediate bulwark against such attacks including hostage taking since a centrally set up force takes time to move into the area of operations.u00a0 Such small commando units ought to be positioned in all urban centres in Maharashtra for quick response till Force-1 reaches the scene. Had such an effective force been available for immediate deployment, the destruction of property in Mumbai or killing on 26/11 might have been minimized.

Having regard to experience of 26/11, the Committee recommends that the major private establishments including, hotels in Mumbai u2013 especially hotels with large foreign national clientele - should set up proper security procedures in consultation with Mumbai Police. For that purpose the Additional CP (Protection Branch) should be designated as a nodal officer for the police u2013 private sector security alliance with active participation from the regional/divisional police units.